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A long-standing controversy is whether LBOs relieve managers from short-term pressures from public
shareholders, or whether LBO funds themselves are driven by short-term profit motives and sacrifice
long-term growth to boost short-term performance. We investigate 495 transactions with a focus on
one form of long-term activities, namely investments in innovation as measured by patenting activity.
We find no evidence that LBOs are associated with a decrease in these activities. Relying on standard
measures of patent quality, we find that patents granted to firms involved in private equity transactions
are more cited (a proxy for economic importance), show no significant shifts in the fundamental nature
























In his influential 1989 paper, “The Eclipse of the Public Corporation,” Michael 
Jensen predicted that the leveraged buyout would emerge as the dominant corporate 
organizational form.  With its emphasis on corporate governance, concentrated ownership 
and monitoring by active owners, strong managerial incentives, and efficient capital 
structure, he argued that the buyout is superior to the public corporation with its dispersed 
shareholders and weak governance.  These features enable managers to make long-run 
investments without catering to the market’s demands for steadily growing quarterly 
profits, which Stein [1988] and others argue can lead firms to myopically sacrifice such 
expenditures.   
These claims excited much debate in the subsequent years. Critics questioned the 
extent to which private equity creates value, suggesting that funds’ profits are instead 
driven by favorable tax treatment of corporate debt, inducing senior executives of 
publicly traded firms to accept deals that go against the interests of the shareholders, or 
abrogating explicit and implicit contracts with workers (e.g., Shleifer and Summers 
[1988]).  More specifically, they queried whether private equity-backed firms actually 
take a longer-run perspective than their public peers, pointing to practices such as special 
dividends and “quick flips”—that is, initial public offerings (IPOs) of firms soon after a 
private equity investment—that enable private equity groups to extract fees and raise new 
funds more quickly. Given their incentives to undertake and exit deals, private equity 
funds may well promote policies that boost short-run performance at the expense of more 
sustained long-term growth.  3 
Ultimately, the nature of the changes in corporate time horizons associated with 
private equity transactions is an empirical question.  In this paper, we present evidence 
about one form of long-run investment, namely changes in innovative investments around 
the time of private equity transactions. This presents an attractive arena to examine these 
issues for a number of reasons.  R&D expenditures have typical features of long-run 
investments. Their costs are expensed immediately, yet the benefits are unlikely to be 
observed for several years: several studies of managerial “myopia” (e.g., Meulbroek, et 
al. [1990]) have examined R&D expenditures for this reason.  Second, an extensive body 
of work about the economics of technological change documents that patenting activity 
and the characteristics of patents reflect the quality and extent of firms’ innovations, 
allowing us to measure firms’ innovative output rather than merely R&D expenditures.  
Since not all research expenditures are well spent, and some critics of major corporations 
(e.g., Jensen [1993]) suggest that many corporate research activities are wasteful and 
yield a low return, changes in R&D expenditures are more difficult to interpret.  While 
the literature acknowledges that patents are not a perfect measures of innovation—for 
example, many inventions are protected as trade secrets—the use of patents as a measure 
of innovative activity is widely accepted.  Moreover, unlike many other measures of 
corporate activity, patents are observable for both public and privately-held firms, which 
is important when studying private equity transactions.   
We examine the changes in patenting behavior of 495 firms with at least one 
successful patent application filed in the period from three years before to five years after  4 
being part of a private equity transaction.
1  Our main finding is that firms pursue more 
influential innovations, as measured by patent citations, in the years following private 
equity investments. Firms display no deterioration in their research, as measured either by 
patent “originality” and “generality,” and the level of patenting does not appear to change 
after these transactions.  We find some evidence that the patent portfolios become more 
focused in the years after private equity investments.  The increase in patent quality is 
greatest in the patent classes where the firm has been focused historically and in the 
classes where the firm increases its patenting activity after the transaction.  The patterns 
are robust to a variety of specifications and controls. Collectively, these findings are 
largely inconsistent with the hypothesis that private equity-backed firms sacrifice long-
run investments.  Rather, private equity investments appear to be associated with a 
beneficial refocusing of firms’ innovative portfolios.
2 
One limitation is that we cannot formally distinguish whether private equity 
investors cause these changes or selectively invest in firms that are ripe for an increase in 
innovative activity. We do not have an instrumental variable to help us resolve the 
causation question. However, our findings related to the timing of the changes and the 
                                                 
1 Throughout this paper, when we refer to private equity transactions or investments, we are referring to 
equity investments by professionally managed partnerships that are leveraged buyouts or other equity 
investments with a substantial amount of associated indebtedness. 
2 One anecdote consistent with this finding is from a practitioner who described to us a major corporation 
where scientists and engineers received badges identifying the number of patent filings they had made. 
Having a platinum or gold badge—awarded only to the most prolific inventors—was very prestigious. One 
can imagine the effect of this incentive scheme on the filing of infra-marginal patents.  5 
predominantly “old economy” nature of the firms in our sample suggest that selection 
plays a relatively minor role in our results. Nonetheless, this alternative interpretation 
should be kept in mind below. 
There are two main related literatures. A number of studies consider the impact of 
leverage, which is a prominent feature of private equity investments, on innovation.  
These studies typically examine publicly traded firms with differing debt levels and reach 
somewhat ambiguous conclusions. There is a clear association between greater leverage 
and lower levels of R&D spending, as documented by Hall’s [1992] examination of over 
1,200 manufacturing firms and Himmelberg and Petersen’s [1994] more targeted study of 
170 small high-technology firms. However, the direction of causality is unclear.  It is 
difficult to determine whether debt leads to R&D reductions or if struggling firms simply 
have more debt and less spending on innovation.  Hao and Jaffe [1993], who carefully 
grapple with this question, conclude that more debt reduces R&D spending only for the 
very smallest firms. For larger firms, the causal relationship is ambiguous. 
A second set of papers examines the impact of leveraged buyouts on innovative 
activity generally. Focusing on buyouts of manufacturing firms during the 1980s, Hall 
[1990] looks at 76 public-to-private transactions, i.e., transactions where a publicly traded 
firm is purchased and taken private.  She finds that the impact of these transactions on 
cumulative innovation is likely slight.  While these firms represent four percent of 
manufacturing employment in 1982, they only account for one percent of the R&D 
spending. Lichtenberg and Siegel [1990] examine 43 LBOs during the 1980s where the 
firms participate in the Bureau of the Census’s survey about research activities prior to  6 
and after the transaction. They find that these firms increase research spending after the 
LBO, both on an absolute basis and relative to their peers. 
There are a several reasons to revisit the questions in the earlier studies. The 
private equity industry is more substantial today than it was in the 1980s. This growth not 
only means that we have a larger sample, but changes in the industry–such as the 
increased competition between and greater operational orientation of private equity 
groups–suggest that the earlier relationships may no longer hold. In addition, transactions 
involving technology-intensive industries have become more common recently. It is also 
desirable to look beyond public-to-private transactions, since these transactions represent 
a fairly small fraction of the private equity universe.
3 Finally, the computerization of 
patent records in the past two decades has substantially enhanced our ability to measure 
and study the impact on innovation. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the construction of 
the data-set. Section 3 reviews the methodology employed in the study. We present the 
empirical analyses in Section 4. The final section concludes the paper and discusses 
future work. 
                                                 
3 Strömberg (2008) shows that public-to-private transactions account for roughly 6% of all private equity-
sponsored LBO activity in terms of numbers, and roughly 27% in terms of total enterprise value of firms 
acquired. Moreover, R&D intensive industries such as Information Technology, Telecom, Medical 
equipment, and Biotech account for roughly 14% of all LBO activity in 2000-2007 (both on an equal- and 
value-weighted basis), compared to around 7% in the pre-1990 period.  7 
2. The Sample 
To construct the dataset, we identify a comprehensive list of private equity 
transactions and match the involved firms to U.S. patent records. This section describes 
this process. 
A. Identifying Private Equity Transactions 
To identify private equity investments, we start from the Capital IQ database. 
Since 1999, Capital IQ has been specialized in tracking private equity deals on a world-
wide basis. Through extensive research, it attempts to “back fill” information about 
investments prior to this period.
4 
Our starting point is the universe of transactions in Capital IQ that closed between 
January 1980 and December 2005. We eliminate two types of transactions. First, Capital 
IQ contains some transactions by private equity groups that did not entail the use of 
leverage. Capital IQ captures a considerable number of venture capital investments by 
traditional venture funds, and many buyout groups made some venture capital 
investments in the late 1990s.  Hence, we eliminate transactions that are not classified in 
the relevant categories (which involve the phrases “going private,” “leveraged buyout,”  
“management buyout,” “platform,” or slight variants of these). Second, the data contain a 
number of transactions that do not involve a financial sponsor (i.e., a private equity firm), 
                                                 
4 Most data services tracking private equity investments were not established until the late 1990s. The most 
geographically comprehensive exception, SDC VentureXpert, was primarily focused on capturing venture 
capital investments until the mid-1990s.  8 
and we eliminate these deals as well.  While transactions in which a management team 
takes a firm private using their own resources and/or bank debt are interesting, they are 
not the focus of this study.  We also remove investments by private equity groups in 
companies that remain traded in public markets after the transaction (so called PIPEs). 
After these eliminations, the data contain approximately eleven thousand transactions. 
We supplement the Capital IQ data with data from Dealogic, another data vendor. 
The Dealogic data often contain more comprehensive information about the 
characteristics of the transactions, such as the multiple of earnings paid and the capital 
structure employed. It also frequently records information about alternative names of the 
firms, add-on acquisitions, and exits, which are useful for matching the data to patent 
records. Finally, we use a variety of databases, including Capital IQ, SDC VentureXpert, 
and compilations of news stories, to identify the characteristics of the transactions and the 
nature of the exits. 
B. Capturing Patent Data  
We restrict our sample to firms with at least one successful patent application 
from three years before the transaction to five year afterwards. We match the firms 
involved in buyout transactions to their patenting records based on their name and 
location. To do this, we employ the Harvard Business School (HBS) patent database.  
The HBS data contain all electronic records of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) through May 2007, but these records have been researched and consolidated, 
which is important, since the names of assignees in the original USPTO database are 
riddled with misspellings and inconsistencies.  We search the HBS database for each of  9 
the firms, using both the original name and any alternative names from Dealogic. The 
firms’ location is contained in Capital IQ, and the patent data contain the location of both 
the inventor(s) and the entity to which the patent is assigned at the time of issue, which is 
typically the inventor’s employer.  There are ambiguous situations where the names are 
similar, but not exactly identical, or where the location of the patentee differs from the 
records of Capital IQ.  In these cases, we research the potential matches, using historical 
editions of the Directory of Corporate Affiliations, Hoover’s Directory, the Factiva 
database of news stories, and web searches. An observation is only included when we are 
confident of a match.  In total, we identify 496 entities with at least one patent grant in 
the period from the calendar year starting three years before to the calendar year starting 
five years after the year of the private equity transaction.
5 
The seemingly small number of patentees likely reflects two facts. First, in many 
instances the companies are “old economy” firms in which intellectual property is less 
central and which have a greater reliance on trade secrets or branding to protect 
intellectual property. Second, the acceleration of private equity activity means that many 
transactions are undertaken in 2004 and 2005. In cases of divisional buyouts, where new 
firms are created, this leaves only a short time for observing any patenting activity. Even 
if these new entities filed for patents, they are unlikely to be issued by May 2007, and we 
only see patent applications that have been successful granted by the USPTO (not 
                                                 
5 We follow the literature in focusing only on utility patents, rather than other awards, such as design or 
reissue awards. Utility patents represent about 99% of all awards (Jaffe and Trajtenberg [2002]).  10 
pending applications). An additional concern arises since more than one-quarter (2,440) 
of the 8,938 patents we identify are assigned to Seagate Technologies.  In contrast, the 
second largest patentee accounts for less than 5% of the sample. Since Seagate would 
dominate our sample, we do not include it in the analyses. Thus, our final sample consists 
of 6,938 patents from 495 firms. 
In Table 1, Panel A, we first summarize the annual private equity investments and 
exits. The transactions are concentrated in the second half of the 1990s and the first half 
of the 2000s. This reflects both the increasing volume of transactions during these years 
and the growing representation of technology firms, which have more patents.  The 
absence of transactions before January 1986 and after December 2005 reflects the 
construction of the sample, which only includes buyout transactions completed during 
this period.  Exits, not surprisingly, lag the transactions by several years. 
Panel A also displays the timing of the patent applications and awards. Each 
patent is associated with two dates: the application date and the grant date. The 
application dates extend from 1983 (three years before the first private equity investment) 
to 2006. No applications from 2007 appear because we only examine successful 
applications that have already been granted by the USPTO. Moreover, the number of 
awards falls sharply in 2007, because we only identify grants through May 2007. The 
growth in private equity investments and patent grants is also illustrated in Figure 1.  
Panel B shows the distribution across types of transactions. Buyouts of corporate 
divisions are most common, followed by private-to-private deals (investments in 
independent unquoted entities), secondary deals (firms that were already owned by  11 
another a private equity investor), and public-to-private deals. These patterns mirror 
private equity investments more generally, as does the preponderance of exits by trade 
sales (i.e., acquisitions by non-financial buyers), revealed in Panel C (see also Strömberg 
[2008]).  
Panel D presents the industry composition of firms and patents. Patents are 
assigned to the primary industry of the parent, as reported by Capital IQ.  In later 
analyses, we use the patent-specific industry classification by the USPTO. Notably, no 
single industry dominates and the sample contains a mixture of “old economy” (e.g., auto 
parts and building products) and “new economy” (for instance, application software and 
healthcare equipment) firms. 
Panel E shows the distribution of the lag between the patent applications and the 
private equity transactions, and it illustrates one of the challenges faced by our 
methodology. The patents we observe are disproportionately applied for in the years 
before and immediately after the buyout. This reflects the “back-end loaded” nature of 
the sample and the lags associated with the patent granting process. Obviously, we cannot 
see successful patents filed five years after a buyout undertaken in 2005, and we do not 
yet observe most of the patents filed five years after a buyout in 2000, since patents, on  12 
average, take more than 30 months to issue, with a substantial minority taking 
considerably longer.
6 
We capture a variety of information about the patent awards. Over the past two 
decades, several quantitative measures of patent quality have become widely adopted 
(Jaffe and Trajtenberg [2002]; Lanjouw, Pakes and Putnam [1998]).  These measures rely 
on the citations either to or by the patent to characterize the nature of the grant (also 
called forward and backward citations).  Citations are extremely important in patent 
filings, since they serve as “property markers” delineating the scope of the granted 
claims.  
Patents that are more cited are typically interpreted as having more impact or as 
being more important than less cited patents. However, the distribution of citations is also 
important.  Patents that cite other patents in a broader array of technology classes are 
often viewed as having more “originality.”  Patents that are themselves cited by a more 
technologically dispersed array of patents are viewed as having greater “generality.” Both 
                                                 
6 Statistics available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2006/50304_table4.html (accessed 
October 21, 2007). It is natural to ask why we only examine successful patent applications, rather than all 
patent filings. Unfortunately, the USPTO did not publish information on applications for patents filed prior 
to November 2000, and even these data are imperfect: not all applications in the U.S. are published and 
information on unsuccessful applications is often removed from the database of applications.  13 
“originality” and “generality” have been interpreted as measures of the fundamental 
importance of the research being patented.
7 
In addition to the truncation problem delineated above, we also face challenges 
around divisional buyouts and cases where the target firm was subsequently acquired by 
another corporation.  In these instances, the firm’s patents may not be assigned to the 
target but rather to the corporate parent. For instance, consider a divisional buyout. Many 
of the patents applied for three years before the buyout are likely to be issued before the 
private equity investment.  In most instances, these will be assigned to the corporate 
parent, and even some patents applied for by employees of the bought-out division that 
are issued after the buyout may nonetheless be assigned to the corporate parent rather 
than to the target corporation. 
While we are unable to comprehensively solve this problem, we can partially 
address this issue. In unreported analyses, we repeat the analyses, capturing some, though 
not all, of the additional patents associated with bought-out firms that are units of larger 
concerns during part of the period during the period from three years before to five years 
after the investment. We identify all patents assigned to the corporate parent prior to the 
private equity investment or assigned to the target’s acquirer after the private equity 
                                                 
7 Each patent is assigned to a primary (three-digit) patent class as well as a subclass using the USPTO’s 
classification scheme. These classifications are important to the USPTO as they are used to search 
subsequent awards. We follow the literature in computing these measures as one minus the Herfindahl 
index of the primary patent class of the cited or citing patents. Thus, a higher measure of originality or 
generality means that the patent is drawing on or being drawn upon by a more diverse array of awards.  14 
investment that have the same assignee as one of the patents assigned to the target. We 
believe that this criterion is conservative.  It will lead us to some, though not all, of the 
missing patents associated with the target, but identify few “false positives,” or patents 
assigned to the parent that are not associated with the target. When we include these 
supplemental patents in the analysis, the statistical and economic significance of the 
results do not change materially.  
3. Methodology 
We focus on the quality, size, and structure of the company’s patent portfolios.  
These features are characterized in four ways. First, following the literature, we use the 
citation count as a measure of the quality, or economic importance, of the patent.  The 
citation count is the number of times the patent has been cited by other patents in the 
calendar year of the patent grant and the three subsequent years (we will refer to this 
period below as a “three-year window”).  In particular, we examine whether citation 
counts change for patents granted before and after the transaction. Second, we examine 
whether the nature of the patents change after the transactions, measured by the patents’ 
“originality” and “generality,” which are computed using the dispersion of the patents 
that cite or are cited by the awarded patent. Moreover, we examine variations in the 
propensity of firms to file for patent protection before and after private equity 
investments.  Finally, we explore whether firms alter their patent filing practices after the 
transactions. In particular, we examine whether the changes in patent quality can be 
explained by firms increasingly patenting in certain areas.  15 
These patterns provide some indications of the impact of private equity 
transactions on long-run investments. If indeed we observe a higher quality of patent 
filings, and a more targeted allocation of innovative activity, the pattern would be 
consistent with the arguments postulated by Jensen [1989, 1993] about the salutatory 
effects of private equity transactions. If we find a decrease in these measures of 
innovative activity, the results would be consistent with the more skeptical views of these 
transactions. 
4. Analysis 
A. Measuring Patent Importance 
We begin by examining the quality of the patents in the sample. As noted above, 
the most widely used measure in the literature is patent citations.  Implementing this 
measure requires deciding the number of years over which the citations are counted after 
the patent is granted. There is a considerable amount of serial correlation in patent 
citations, and patents that are highly cited in their first few years tend to be cited heavily 
throughout.  Moreover, since our sample is back-end loaded, we prefer a shorter window 
to reduce the truncation of the sample at the end.  Consequently, we use a three-year 
period of citations to construct our citation counts variable, but the serial correlation  16 
means that little information is lost by ignoring later citations.
8  We examine the 
sensitivity of the results to this choice in Section 4C below. 
Table 2 presents the first comparison of patents filed for before and after the 
transactions. The two panels treat patents filed in the calendar year of the private equity 
investment differently. Focusing on Panel B, we observe that, on average, patents issued 
before and in the year of the transactions are cited 1.99 times in the first three years after 
they are granted. In contrast, patents issued after the transactions are cited 2.49 times over 
the three years after the grant date, corresponding to a 25% increase in the number of 
citations. 
These comparisons are instructive but coarse, since they are based on the raw 
citation counts. Figures 2 and 3 plot the number of citations in the year of the patent grant 
and the three years thereafter for each of the patents in the sample, as well as the average 
number of citations for matching patents.  These matching patents are defined as follows.  
For each patent in the sample, we determine all U.S. patents granted in the same year and 
assigned to the same USPTO technology class.
9  We observe a clear increase in the 
average number of citations for the patents granted to the private equity-backed firms. In 
                                                 
8 In the USPTO data, patents are typically not cited prior to issuance. This reflects the fact that many 
awards are not published prior to issuance and that the USPTO does not update its records of citations to 
published patent applications to include the number of the ultimately granted patents. Thus, the grant date 
is the beginning of the period when a patent can garner citations. 
9 Patents are assigned during the application process to one of approximately one thousand technology 
classes, as well as a more detailed subclass. These classifications are important, since they are the primary 
way in which the USPTO identifies other relevant patents during the examination process.  17 
part, this may reflect the increasing importance of patents in later years, but it may also 
reflect two other changes. As the pace of patenting world-wide accelerates, the frequency 
of patent citations has increased. Furthermore, as private equity investments in high-
technology industries become more common, the representation of patents in 
technologically dynamic industries has grown. Figure 3 captures these trends, and this 
figure shows a clear increase in the average number of citations, as well as the dispersion 
of citations, for the matching patents.  Hence, it is important to control for the timing of 
the patent grant and its technology class. 
To address this concern, Table 2 also reports the relative citation counts. These 
are calculated as the number of citations in the calendar year of the grant and the three 
calendar years thereafter (citation count) less the average number of citations during this 
period to matching patents, which have the same grant year and primary USPTO class.  
When comparing the relative citation counts, both the absolute and percentage increases 
in the counts are as great as or greater than the increases for the raw, unadjusted citation 
counts. For the measures of “originality” and “generality,” the economical and statistical 
magnitudes are smaller when comparing the relative measures to the raw ones.  
To provide a more nuanced view of the changes in the patent citations, we turn to 
a multivariate analysis. A natural starting point is the Poisson count model. The defining 
property of this model is that, for each patent i, the individual citation events are 
independently distributed over the three years following the grant of the patent with 
intensity  i λ . This implies that the three-year citation count is distributed according to the 










==  (1) 
and the patent receives on average  i λ  citations over the three years following the grant 
date.  To compare the citation intensities before and after the transactions, we estimate 
the standard Poisson specification 
  ( ) ln ii X λ β ′ =  (2) 
Here Xi contains observed characteristics, including variables capturing whether the 
application date is before of after the date of the transaction. Estimates are reported in 
Table 3, but before discussing these estimates, a limitation of this model should be noted.  
In the Poisson model, the citation intensity is a deterministic function of the observed 
characteristics.  However, there may be unobserved factors that affect the citation 
intensity, and such factors would cause overdispersion of the citation counts relative to 
the Poisson model (see Cameron and Trivedi [1998] and Hausman, Hall, and Griliches 
[1984]).
10 In our sample, when testing for overdispersion, the basic Poisson model is 
consistently rejected.  The Negative Binomial model is a generalization of the Poisson 
model that addresses this problem. It includes an additional error term to capture 
unobserved factors, and the distribution of the three-year citation count is a mixture of the 
                                                 
10 Another potential source of overdispersion is a disproportionate number of patents with zero citations 
(see Cameron and Trivedi [1998]). We repeat the analysis using zero-inflated Poisson and Negative 
Binomial models and find results that are consistently slightly stronger than the reported results.  19 
Poisson distribution and the distribution of this error term. Using this model, we estimate 
the specification 
  ( ) ln ii i X λ βε ′ = +  (3) 
where  i ε  is an i.i.d. random variable with mean zero. 
To control for changes in citation behavior and the industry composition of 
companies in our sample, we control for the baseline citation intensities, using the 
matching patents described above.  This is implemented as follows. For each patent, we 




γ =  (4) 
where Total Citations is the number of citations received by all matching USPTO patents 
during the three years following their grant dates.  For patent i,  i γ  gives the baseline 
citation intensity.  By including this baseline in the estimation, the estimates control for 
technology- and year-specific variations in the citation patterns.  Hence, we estimate the 
Poisson and Negative Binomial specifications 
  ( ) ( ) ln ln ii i X λ βγ ′ =+  (5) 
and 
  ( ) ( ) ln ln ii i i X λβ γ ε ′ = ++  (6)  20 
To interpret the parameters in these specifications, note that when  0 i X β ′ = , the 
citation intensity equals the baseline intensity for the matching group of patents.  When 
i X β ′  is greater (or smaller) than zero, the citation intensity is proportionally greater (or 
smaller) than the intensity for the matched group. Finally, note that the reported 
coefficients are incidence rates, reflecting the proportional effect of an increase in the 
underlying characteristic.  An incidence rate greater than one corresponds to a positive 
coefficient and a positive effect of the characteristic on the intensity.  For binary 
variables, the reported incidence rate is the proportional increase in citation intensity 
following an increase in the variable from zero to one. 
The results are reported in Table 3.  In the first four regressions, the independent 
variables are indicators for the individual years of the patent filing relative to the year of 
the private equity transaction. In each case, applications in the second through fifth year 
after the transaction are cited significantly more frequently. To illustrate, in the first 
regression, the coefficient of 1.786 for patents applied for three years after the transaction 
implies that these patents garner 78.6% more citations than those applied for in the year 
of the transaction. Except for the first specification, the coefficients in the first three rows 
are not significantly different from one. The coefficients may suggest a decline in citation 
intensity from years -3 or -2 to the year of the transaction (year 0 is the base year, with a 
coefficient normalized to one), but this decline is an order of magnitude smaller than the 
subsequent increase and less significant. For the relative citation intensities, this initial 
decline largely disappears, meaning that patents filed for before the transaction are cited 
about as frequently as the patents in the matching group. However, except for the year  21 
immediately after the transaction, the coefficients for subsequent years are greater than 
one and consistently significant, showing that patents filed after the private equity 
investment are cited significantly more frequently than the patents in the matched group.  
This pattern is found both for absolute and relative citation intensities, although it is 
slightly more pronounced for the relative intensities that control for the timing and 
industry composition of the patents. 
In the fifth and sixth columns of Table 3, we use a more parsimonious 
specification, in which the dummy variable Post equals one, if the patent was applied for 
in the first through fifth year after the private equity investment. Again, this coefficient is 
substantially greater than one and statistically highly significant, confirming our finding 
that citation count increase following private equity transactions.  
One concern is that buyout funds “cherry pick” companies and focus their 
investments in companies with stronger innovation potential.  In this case, our findings 
may reflect this “selection” rather than the investors’ effect on the companies.  While we 
do not have an instrumental variable that would allow us to definitively resolve this issue, 
we believe that this is a small concern for two reasons. As mentioned above, the majority 
of the companies in our sample are “old economy” companies where innovation and 
intellectual property are less central to their businesses. The innovation potential of these 
companies is unlikely to be an important factor for the private equity funds when they 
make investment decisions.  Moreover, as observed in Table 3, the majority of the 
increase in the citation rate comes in the second and third years after the transaction. Hall, 
Griliches, and Hausman [1986] study the lag between R&D activities and patent  22 
applications and find that they move virtually simultaneously, suggesting that most of the 
change in the patent quality does not take place until sometimes after the transaction, 
making it less likely to having influenced the investors’ initial decision to undertake the 
investment. 
The key results are robust to the use of fixed- and random-effects specifications, 
as reported in Table 4. In particular, we find that in the four Poisson specifications (with 
random and fixed effects, and the controls for individual years and the more 
parsimonious specification with the post-investment dummy), the years after the private 
equity investment are associated with consistently more significant patents. The 
magnitudes of the coefficients do not change appreciably from those in Table 3. The 
results are weaker but quantitatively similar when we employ the Negative Binomial 
specification with fixed and random effects in columns five and six, due to the additional 
flexibility of this model.   
B. The Fundamental Nature of the Patents 
One possibility is that the patents awarded to the firms are more economically 
important, but the firms are sacrificing more basic or fundamental research that will not 
yield commercial benefits for some time going forward.  
We thus turn to examining the fundamental nature of the patents awarded to these 
firms, using the measures of patent originality and generality described above. In Table 2, 
we see that when we examine these measures, patents applied for after the private equity 
investments are somewhat more general but less original than those applied for  23 
beforehand. Once we adjust for the average generality and originality of awards in the 
same patent class and with the same grant year, these differences essentially disappear. 
A similar conclusion emerges from the regression analyses in Table 5. When we 
run regressions akin to those in earlier tables (now employing an ordinary least squares 
specification with patentee fixed effects), we find that the awards applied for after the 
private equity investments are somewhat more general and less original.
11  Once we use 
the relative originality and generality by subtracting the averages for patents in the same 
class and grant year as independent variables, the significance of these differences 
essentially disappears. Thus, private equity investments do not seem to be associated with 
a change in the fundamental nature of the (patented) research.  
C. Robustness Checks of the Patent Quality Analyses 
In undertaking the analyses of patent quality, we needed to make a number of 
assumptions. In this section, we summarize the results of unreported supplemental 
analyses, where we relax these assumptions. 
One issue was posed by private equity investments where there was already an 
existing investor. These investments are typically secondary buyouts, where one sponsor 
buys out the stake of another. As a result, some patents may be double-counted: they may 
be simultaneously prior to one transaction and after another. We repeat the analysis, 
                                                 
11 The sample size is smaller in regressions examining generality because computing this measure requires 
that patents are subsequently cited.  24 
employing these patents only the first time they appear and then dropping them entirely.  
The results are little changed. 
A second concern was posed by our measure of patent citations, which only uses 
the citation count during the three years after the award.  As mentioned above, the 
number of citations to a given patent in each year is strongly serially correlated, so we 
should identify the same patents as heavily cited ones whatever window we use. Using a 
long window to identify citations enhances the accuracy of our identification of important 
patents but reduces our sample size. We repeat the analysis, using citations through the 
end of the second calendar year after the patent grant, as well as after the fourth year, and 
the results are qualitatively similar.  
A third concern has to do with what we term “cherry picking” in divisional 
buyouts. In particular, we worried that corporate parents, when they determine which 
pending patent applications will be assigned to the private equity-backed firm at the time 
of the buyout, will select only low quality patents: the best patents, even if very relevant 
to the target firm, will be retained by the corporate parent. This tendency might lead to an 
apparent increase in quality in the patents applied for after the award, while all we are 
really seeing is an unbiased sample of the unit’s patents. 
We can partially address this concern by using the enhanced sample described 
above. We also address this issue by rerunning the cross-tabulations and regressions 
above while excluding the divisional buyouts from our sample. Since the buyouts in the 
sub-sample are not “carved out” of firms, but involve the purchase of an entire  25 
corporation, this problem should not be present. The key results are little changed as a 
result of this shift. 
Another robustness check is to examine the impact of the holding periods of the 
private equity groups. If private equity groups only affect the companies in their 
portfolios gradually, we might expect that firms that have been held by private equity 
investors for longer periods would have a more dramatic increase in innovative output. In 
unreported regressions analyzing patent citations, we find support for this hypothesis. 
The pattern is no longer statistically significant, however, when we add firm fixed effects 
to the specification. 
D. Analysis of Level of Patenting 
In the last three tables, we move from examining the quality of individual patents 
to looking at the mixture of the overall patenting activity generated in the years before 
and after the private equity investments.  
A natural first question is how the level of patenting activity changes around the 
time of a private equity investment. If the average number of successful patent filings 
falls dramatically, our interpretation of the earlier finding that the importance of the 
issued patents rises considerably might be quite different: it would suggest cutbacks of 
unproductive innovative activities rather than repositioning of research from lower to 
higher impact topics.  
The analysis of patenting prior to and after the private equity investment is 
problematic, however, for several reasons. While we can adjust for the truncation  26 
associated with the timing of the patent applications (the fact that, in many cases, not all 
patents in the five years after the private equity investments in our sample have been 
applied for, much less awarded), it is very difficult to control for the assignment of 
patents to corporate parents and the fact may of our companies are not stand-alone 
entities in the years surrounding the transaction. As noted above, we will be able to see 
some but not all of patents assigned to targets that were units of larger firms prior to 
divisional buyouts or else were ultimately acquired by other concerns. When no patents 
are observed in a year, it is difficult to say whether the company did not file for patents or 
whether it was not operating as an independent entity. Consequently, we exclude 
divisional buyouts for the analysis below. Moreover, we estimate specifications restricted 
to buyouts taking place before 1999 and to companies that have patent filings in three 
years before the transaction and five years after the transaction, suggesting that these 
companies were independent entities during the entire period.  
Moreover, the analysis faces an identification problem. As observed previously, 
the composition of firms and the citation patterns change during our sample period, 
making time controls important. Ideally, the specification would also include individual 
company fixed effects as well as separate indicators for the years surrounding the 
transactions. However, this specification is not identified, since the company fixed effect 
defines the event time, which, together with the indicator for the year surrounding the 
event, uniquely determines the year. (See Berndt and Griliches [1993] and Hall, 
Mairesse, and Turner [2007] for detailed analyses of this problem). There is no entirely 
satisfactory solution. We circumvent this problem by replacing the individual indicators 
for the years surrounding the event with a single “Post” dummy. This identifies the  27 
regression, but the identifying assumption is that the patenting levels are constant before 
and after the transaction (i.e., the full transition takes place in the year of the transaction). 
To verify the robustness of this assumption, we also report estimates of specifications 
with a dummy that equals one from year two after the transaction (“Post Plus One”), 
allowing for a more gradual effect. Note, that this identification problem is not a concern 
for our analysis of citation counts, since we could use the citation rates for matching 
patents to calculate the relative citation intensities, and in this way avoid including 
individual year fixed effects.  
Despite these limitations, in Table 6 we undertake an analysis of the level of 
patenting.  An observation is a target firm-year pair: that is, for each transaction in 2000 
and before, we use nine observations for each transaction, from three years prior to five 
years after the transaction.  (For transactions in subsequent years, we use smaller number 
of observations, reflecting our inability to see patent filings made after 2005.)  The 
dependent variable is the number of ultimately successful patent filings made in the given 
calendar year. 
    The initial analysis, in the first two columns of Table 6, uses the entire sample. 
These regressions, like all those reported in this table, include fixed effects for each year 
and each firm to control for the differing propensity to patent. In these specifications, we 
include a post dummy denoting observations after the buyout (or post plus one, as 
explained above). The coefficients smaller than one on the post dummies suggest that 
there is a decline in patenting activity following the buyouts.   28 
We might worry, however, that this result is an artifact of our sample 
construction: in particular, while we observe some successful patent filings in the final 
years of the sample, there are likely to be many applications that were filed in these years 
that had not been issued as of May 2007. (Recall the average patent pendency today is 
about 30 months.) Because observations of patent filings in 2004 and 2005, where this 
selection bias will be the worst, are disproportionately likely to be in the years after 
private equity transactions, this effect may bias our counts of patent filings. 
We thus repeat the analyses restricting the sample in two ways. First, in columns 
3 and 4, we limit the analysis to private equity investments prior to 1999. In these 
regressions, effects due to not-yet-issued patent applications should be much less severe. 
Again, we include both firm and year fixed effects. The trend reverses and we find 
significant positive effects of buyouts on patenting activity. 
A remaining worry is that these results may be affected by some firms not being 
stand-alone firms in the years before or after this transaction, even if the transaction itself 
is not a divisional buyout.  To ensure we have patenting information about the individual 
firms in the years surrounding the transaction, specifications 5 and 6 condition on the 
firm having received a patent both in the years three years before and five years after the 
transaction: i.e., we require that the firm had received a patent both in Event Year -3 and 
in Event Year +5. This reduces the concern that we do not observe patents for the firm in 
the entire nine-year window.  It also introduces a concern that companies that are stand-
alone entities before and remain stand-alone entities after the transaction are special in 
other ways, which may affect our results as well.  In the two reported specifications (and  29 
other unreported ones), we find that the post-buyout dummy is either weakly negative or 
weakly positive. 
Taken together, the results do not suggest any clear change in the amount of 
patenting. While our conclusions must be somewhat tentative due to the discussed 
difficulties in measurement, questions of causation, and the remaining uncertainties, the 
absence of a consistent pattern is evident. 
E. Analysis of Patent Portfolios 
In the final section, we turn to considering the structure of the patent portfolios 
constructed by these firms in the years before and after the private equity investments. 
Since the previous section shows that the increase in patent importance is not driven by 
private equity-backed firms reducing the number of filings, it is natural to wonder about 
the dynamics behind the change in quality.  
The initial analysis is presented in the final line in Panel A of Table 2. We 
compare the Herfindahl index, or concentration measure, of the patent classes in which 
firms’ awards are assigned. In this comparison, we restrict the sample to the 70 firms 
with at least four patent applications in the sample filed prior to the private equity 
investment and at least four patents applied for afterwards, in order to ensure the 
computed measures of concentration are meaningful.  When we undertake this 
comparison, we find that firms after private equity investments are likely to have more 
concentrated patent portfolios than beforehand, but the p-value is just above the 10% 
threshold.  30 
We can gain some additional insights as to how these more concentrated 
portfolios emerge from the cross-tabulations in Table 7. In this table, each patent is an 
observation, and we examine citations in the years prior to and after the private equity 
investment, similar to the analysis in Table 2. We now divide the patents, though, in two 
ways. In Panel A, we divide the observations into those whose primary patent class 
assignment was more or less well populated prior to the investments: more precisely, 
whether the firm, in applications filed in the three years prior to the private equity 
transaction, had above or below the median share of patenting in that primary patent 
class. In Panel B, we divide the patents by whether the share of patenting in the primary 
class increased or decreased after the private equity transaction. 
The cross-tabulations provide additional insights into the sources of the increase 
in patent importance. First, we see from Panel A that awards in the firms’ focal 
technologies—the areas where they had done a disproportionate amount of patenting 
prior to the transaction—are more likely to increase in quality, whether raw or adjusted 
patent counts are used. Panel B reveals that patent classes that experience an increase in 
patenting share are also disproportionately where the increase in patent quality occurred.  
These patterns are consistent with the private equity-backed firms focusing their 
innovative investments in their core areas of strength and generating higher-impact patent 
portfolios as a result. 
Consistent results emerge from Table 8, which presents Negative Binomial 
regression analyses akin to that in the fifth and sixth columns of Table 3. We now add 
controls for the share of patenting in the primary patent class prior to the private equity  31 
investment (in the first and second regressions) and for the change in the share of 
patenting in that class from before to after the investment (in the third and fourth 
regressions), as well as interactions between the patent measure and the dummy denoting 
an award filed in the first through fifth years after the private equity investment. Because 
the measures of patent shares may be misleading if there are just a handful of patents 
assigned to a given firm, we undertake the analysis both using the entire sample (the first 
and third columns) and only for patents of firms which had at least four patents prior to 
the private equity investments and four after (the second and fourth columns).   
The significantly greater than one coefficient for the variable “Share of Firm's 
Pre-Investment Patents in Class” suggest that patents in the firms’ “core” areas—the 
areas where there was more patenting prior to the private equity investment—are 
disproportionately likely to be more cited ones. Moreover, the interaction term is greater 
than one. Not only are these patents more important, but their impact appears to increase 
substantially after the private equity investment.  
The variable “Change in Firm’s Patent in Class Pre- and Post- Investment” 
initially presents a more confusing picture. The coefficient is again greater than one—
areas where there is growth are more important ones—but the significance is only 
marginal. In column 3, the interaction term is less than one, but when we restrict the 
sample to those firms with four patents before and after the transaction (or similar cut-
offs), the interaction becomes greater than one and significant. Once we exclude firms 
with only modest patenting activity, an increase in patenting is associated with a sharp 
(and highly significant) boost in patent quality.   32 
Thus, these analyses suggest that private equity-backed firms tend to focus their 
patent filings. This focusing process is not indiscriminate, however, but tends to 
concentrate on core technologies. Moreover, the very process of focusing seems to lead 
the patents in these classes to have greater impact after the private equity investment.  
5. Conclusions 
This paper examines the changes around the time of investments by private equity 
groups on firms’ long-run investments, focusing on innovative activities. We examine 
patents filed by 495 firms that received private equity backing between 1986 and 2005. 
We find that patents of private equity-backed firms applied for in the years after the 
investment are more frequently cited. These firms show no deterioration after the 
investments in patent originality and generality, which proxy for the fundamental nature 
of the research. The level of patenting does not appear to consistently change, and the 
firms’ patent portfolios become more focused in the years after the private equity 
investments. Breakdowns of the patenting patterns suggest that the areas where the firms 
concentrate their patenting after the private equity investment, and the historical core 
strengths of the firm, tend to be the areas where the increase in patent impact is 
particularly great. 
We see three avenues for future research into the relationship of private equity 
and innovation. While each will require additional data collection, they should deepen 
our understanding of this important phenomenon: First, is sensitivity of innovative 
activity to market changes less for private equity-backed firms? Financial economists 
have argued that the public market can give misleading signals to firms regarding  33 
appropriate investments, but that managers nonetheless feel pressured to follow the 
market’s lead (e.g., Baker, Stein, and Wurgler [2003]). If this argument is right, and 
private equity investors provide insulation against these pressures, we might anticipate 
that investments in innovation by private equity-backed firms would be less sensitive to 
the shifts in market sentiment. To examine this, we will need to link the patent activity to 
changes in financial and accounting performance.  
Second, do private equity-backed firms differ in their management of patent 
portfolios? In the past decade, U.S. patentees have needed to pay renewal fees in order to 
keep their patents active. Some large firms appear to have an automatic policy of 
renewing patents, even if the bulk of patents have little value. It would be interesting to 
observe if private equity-backed firms are less likely to renew patents, particularly lightly 
cited ones, than the norm.  
Finally, how do sales of divisions affect innovation by the parent firms? Recent 
research has suggested that firms that are more reliant on internal capital markets to 
reallocate resources across divisions produce both a lesser number of innovations and 
also less novel innovations (Seru [2007]). We can examine patenting not just by target 
firms, but also of the corporate parents of these targets. Do the changes associated with 
the sell-off of the target lead the (presumably more focused) parent firm to pursue a more 
effective innovation strategy?  34 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A: Year of Private Equity Investments and Exits with Patenting in [-3,+5] Window 
 
   LBOs     Patents 
 Transactions Exits  Applications Grants 
1983 N/A N/A  52 0
1984 N/A N/A  52 17
1985 N/A N/A  56 55
1986 1 0 60 58
1987 0 0 42 54
1988 0 0 37 56
1989 2 0 25 48
1990 0 0 19 23
1991 0 0 17 21
1992 0 0 16 14
1993 3 0 30 19
1994 1 0 64 20
1995 11 0 99 30
1996 17 1 153 57
1997 24 4 313 79
1998 32 3 456 166
1999 53 2 593 309
2000 44 5 805 412
2001 37 3 968 587
2002 49 6 1035 683
2003 70 22 869 680
2004 87 29 462 819
2005 64 41 155 801
2006 N/A 47 20 996
2007 N/A 25   0 394
 
 
Panel B: Type of Private Equity Investments with Patenting in [-3,+5] Window 
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Panel C: Type of Private Equity Exits with Patenting in [-3,+5] Window 
 
  Number of 
Investments 
No Exit  191 
Secondary 59 
Initial Public Offering  38 





Panel D: Industry Distribution of Private Equity Investments with Patenting in [-3,+5] Window and 
Associated Patents 
 
  Share of Industry 
 Investments Patents 
Industrial Machinery  9.9%  8.3% 
Auto Parts and Equipment  5.2%  11.4% 
Commodity Chemicals  4.8%  4.8% 
Electrical Equipment Manufacturers  4.8%  5.8% 
Building Products  4.2%  1.9% 
Application Software  3.4%  3.2% 
Leisure Products  3.0%  4.5% 
Healthcare Equipment  2.6%  3.0% 
Specialty Chemicals  2.4%  4.8% 




Panel E: Lag between Private Equity Investment and Patent Application 
 
  Number of Applications 
Three Years Prior  1,131 
Two Years Prior  1,163 
One Year Prior  1,121 
Year of Investment  925 
One Year After  721 
Two Years After  531 
Three Years After  360 
Four Years After  264 
Five Years After  182 
 
NOTE: The sample consists of 6,398 patents awarded through May 2007 to 495 firms that received private 
equity backing between 1986 and 2005. Firms are only included in the sample if they applied for patents in 
the period between three years before and five years after the private equity investment.  39 
Table 2: Univariate Tests of Differences of Patents in Sample 
 
Panel A: Comparing Patents Filed in Years [-3,-1] and [0,5] 
  
Mean  
[-3, 1]  Obs.  Mean [0,5] Obs.  Diff. 
p-val. t-
Test 
Citations 2.015 [2494]  2.277 [1713]  0.262  0.028 
Relative Citations  0.267 [2494]  0.530 [1713]  0.262  0.028 
Generality 0.691 [2033]  0.708 [1383]  0.017  0.101 
Relative Generality  0.002 [2032]  -0.006 [1381]  -0.008  0.390 
Originality 0.513 [3383]  0.502 [2963]  -0.011  0.110 
Relative Originality  -0.049 [3281] -0.050 [2808]  -0.001  0.853 
Herfindahl Index of 
Patent Classes  0.294 [70] 0.328 [70]  0.034  0.113 
            
Panel B: Comparing Patents Filed in Years [-3,0] and [1,5] 
  
Mean  
[-3,0] Obs.  Mean  [1,5] Obs.  Diff. 
p-val. t-
test 
Citations 1.987 [3076]  2.486 [1131]  0.499  0.000 
Relative Citations  0.240 [3076]  0.739 [1131]  0.499  0.000 
Generality 0.695 [2503]  0.706 [913]  0.011  0.332 
Relative Generality  0.004 [2501]  -0.016 [912]  -0.020  0.047 
Originality 0.515 [4301]  0.495 [2045]  -0.020  0.007 
Relative Originality  -0.048 [4166] -0.052 [1923]  -0.004  0.594 
 
NOTE: The sample consists of 6398 patents awarded through May 2007 to 495 firms that received private 
equity backing between 1986 and 2005. Citation counts are calculated for the subsample of 4207 patents 
awarded before December 2004. Firms are only included in the sample if they applied for patents in the 
period between three years before and five years after the private equity investment. The comparisons in 
the table above are made at the individual patent level, except for the calculation of the Herfindahl index of 
firms’ patent classes, which is done on the firm level. The latter calculations are only undertaken if the firm 
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Table 3: Count Models of Citation Intensity 





















Event  Year  -3 1.089**  1.012 1.089 1.035     
  (0.041) (0.038) (0.085) (0.077)     
Event  Year  -2 1.107*** 1.037 1.107 1.060     
  (0.043) (0.040) (0.090) (0.082)     
Event  Year  -1 1.029 1.021 1.029 1.024     
  (0.041) (0.041) (0.085) (0.081)     
Event  Year  1  1.042 1.064 1.042 1.092     
  (0.048) (0.049) (0.099) (0.099)     
Event Year 2  1.300*** 1.401*** 1.300**  1.375***    
  (0.062) (0.067) (0.135) (0.135)     
Event Year 3  1.786*** 1.942*** 1.786*** 1.919***    
  (0.088) (0.095) (0.210) (0.213)     
Event Year 4  1.574*** 1.750*** 1.574*** 1.714***    
  (0.093) (0.104) (0.219) (0.225)     
Event Year 5  1.473*** 1.805*** 1.473**  1.787***    
  (0.120) (0.147) (0.281) (0.323)     
Post LBO 
Dummy 
     1.251***  1.381*** 
     (0.064)  (0.067) 
Observations  4207 4205 4207 4205 4207 4205 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
NOTE: The sample consists of 4207 patents awarded through December 2004 to 495 firms that received 
private equity backing between 1986 and 2005.  Firms are only included in the sample if they applied for 
patents in the period between three years before and five years after the private equity investment. The unit 
of observation is each patent in the sample with at least three years to be cited. The dependent variable is 
the number of citations received in the three years after the award. Reported coefficients are incidence 
rates. A coefficient greater than one corresponds to a positive relationship between the explanatory variable 
and the citation intensity.      41 
Table 4: Relative Citation Intensity with Patentee Fixed and Random Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 


























Event Year -3  1.145*** 1.131***     1.107  1.080 
 (0.048)  (0.046)      (0.072)  (0.068) 
Event Year -2  1.192*** 1.185***     1.119*  1.105 
 (0.050)  (0.049)      (0.073)  (0.070) 
Event Year -1  1.080*  1.069      1.027  1.015 
 (0.045)  (0.045)      (0.068)  (0.066) 
Event Year 1  1.045  1.044      0.912  0.924 
 (0.050)  (0.050)      (0.072)  (0.071) 
Event Year 2  1.446*** 1.426***     1.037  1.041 
 (0.073)  (0.072)      (0.093)  (0.090) 
Event Year 3  1.779*** 1.761***     1.210**  1.207** 
 (0.093)  (0.092)      (0.118)  (0.115) 
Event Year 4  1.720*** 1.703***     1.235*  1.242* 
 (0.110)  (0.108)      (0.144)  (0.140) 
Event Year 5  1.689*** 1.704***     1.218  1.246 
 (0.147)  (0.146)      (0.196)  (0.196) 
Post LBO Dummy      1.244*** 1.243***    
   (0.035)  (0.034)    
Observations  4005 4205 4005 4205 4005 4205 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
NOTE: The sample consists of 4207 patents awarded through December 2004 to 495 firms that received 
private equity backing between 1980 and 2005. Firms are only included in the sample if they applied for 
patents in the period between three years before and five years after the private equity investment The unit 
of observation is each patent in the sample with at least three years to be cited. The dependent variable is 
the number of citations received in the three years after the award. Reported coefficients are incidence 
rates. A coefficient greater than one corresponds to a positive relationship between the explanatory variable 
and the citation intensity.    42 
 
Table 5: OLS Estimates of Originality and Generality with Patentee Fixed Effects 
 










Event Year -3  0.029**  0.002        -0.115***  -0.027*       
  (0.012)  (0.012)     (0.017)  (0.016)    
Event  Year  -2  0.002  -0.011     -0.078***  -0.025    
  (0.012)  (0.012)     (0.016)  (0.016)    
Event  Year  -1  -0.004  -0.010     -0.045***  -0.022    
  (0.012)  (0.012)     (0.017)  (0.016)    
Event  Year  1  -0.020  -0.011     0.036*  0.002    
  (0.013)  (0.013)     (0.019)  (0.019)    
Event  Year  2  -0.021  -0.001     0.029  -0.022    
  (0.015)  (0.014)     (0.022)  (0.021)    
Event  Year  3  -0.020  0.003     0.108***  0.006    
  (0.017)  (0.017)     (0.024)  (0.023)    
Event  Year  4  -0.041**  0.005     0.120***  -0.008    
  (0.019)  (0.019)     (0.029)  (0.028)    
Event Year 5  -0.095*** -0.048**      0.056  -0.108***    
  (0.022)  (0.023)     (0.036)  (0.035)    
Post LBO Dummy      -0.033*** -0.002      0.114*** 0.007 
     (0.008)  (0.008)     (0.012)  (0.012) 
Constant 0.513*** -0.044*** 0.519*** -0.049*** 0.731***  0.017  0.667*** -0.003 
  (0.009) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) 
Observations  6346 6089 6346 6089 3416 3413 3416  3413 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
NOTE: The sample consists of 6398 patents awarded through May 2007 to 495 firms that received private equity backing between 1980 and 2005. 
Firms are only included in the sample if they applied for patents in the period between three years before and five years after the private equity 
investment The unit of observation is each patent in the sample for which originality and generality can be computed. The dependent variables are the 
originality and generality of the patents. Relative originality and generality are computed by subtracting the average originality and generality for 
patents in the same year and class.  
  43 
 
Table 6: Poisson Model of Patent Counts with Fixed Effects (excluding divisional buyouts) 
 
   (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)    (5)  (6) 
 Full  Sample    Before  1999   
















Event  Year  0 1.025  1.011  1.407*** 1.417***   0.997 1.039 
 (0.046)  (0.047)  (0.179)  (0.185)   (0.058) (0.063) 
Event  Year  1   0.893*    1.533***    0.841**
   (0.052)    (0.239)      (0.068) 
Post 0.883**   1.534***    0.865*  
 (0.051)    (0.238)      (0.068)  
Post Plus One   0.841**   1.578**      1.013 
      (0.061)       (0.311)        (0.103) 
Observations 3468 3468   819  819   1181  1181 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
NOTE: The sample consists of 6398 patents awarded through May 2007 to 495 firms that received private equity backing between 1980 and 2005. 
Firms are only included in the sample if they applied for patents in the period between three years before and five years after the private equity 
investment The unit of observation is each patent in the sample for which originality and generality can be computed. The dependent variables are the 
originality and generality of the patents. The table reports incidence rate ratios. Reported coefficients are incidence rates. A coefficient greater than one 
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Table 7: Univariate Tests of Differences in Patent Citations 
 
Panel A: Comparing Patents in Well- and Poorly Populated Patent 








Citations in First Three Years    
   In Well-Populated Classes  2.17 3.60 0.000  2386 
   In Poorly Populated Classes  1.68 1.69 0.956  1821 
Relative Citations in First 3 Years     
   In Well-Populated Classes  0.42 1.86 0.000  2386 
   In Poorly Populated Classes  -0.06 -0.06 0.956  1821 
   
Panel B: Comparing Patents in Growing and Shrinking Patent Classes 








Citations in First Three Years    
   In Growing Classes  2.50 2.76 0.240  1754 
   In Shrinking Classes  1.77 1.72 0.819  2456 
Relative Citations in First 3 Years     
   In Growing Classes  0.75 1.01 0.240  1754 
   In Shrinking Classes  0.02 -0.02 0.819  2456 
 
NOTE: The sample consists of 6398 patents awarded through May 2007 to 495 firms that received private 
equity backing between 1980 and 2005. Firms are only included in the sample if they applied for patents in 
the period between three years before and five years after the private equity investment The comparisons in 
the table above are made at the individual patent level. We divide the patents by whether the share of the 
firm’s patents prior to the private equity investment in the given patent class was above or below the 
median, and by whether the share of the firm’s patents in the class after the buyout was greater or less or 
equal to that prior to the transaction. 
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Table 8: Negative Binomial Regressions with Controls for Patent Class share 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 










Post LBO Dummy  0.989  0.952  1.414*** 1.327*** 
  (0.066) (0.073) (0.077) (0.081) 
Share of Firm's Pre-Investment 
Patents in Class 
1.283*** 1.732***   
 (0.118)  (0.229)     
Post LBO * Share…  3.669*** 4.389***    
 (0.657)  (0.987)     
Change in Firm’s Patent in 
Class Pre- and Post- 
Investment 
   1.207** 1.323 
     (0.109)  (0.288) 
Post LBO * Change…      0.570*** 2.666** 
     (0.106)  (1.214) 
Observations  4063 2883 4063 2883 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
NOTE: The sample consists of 6398 patents awarded through May 2007 to 495 firms that received private 
equity backing between 1980 and 2005. Firms are only included in the sample if they applied for patents in 
the period between three years before and five years after the private equity investment The unit of 
observation is each patent class in which a firm received a patent in the three calendar years prior to that of 
the investment. The dependent variable is the share of patents in that class after the investment. The table 
reports incidence rate ratios. 
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NOTE: The sample consists of 6398 patents awarded through May 2007 to 495 firms that received private 
equity backing between 1980 and 2005. Firms are only included in the sample if they applied for patents in 
the period between three years before and five years after the private equity investment  47 


































NOTE: The sample consists of 6398 patents awarded through May 2007 to 495 firms that received private 
equity backing between 1980 and 2005. Firms are only included in the sample if they applied for patents in 
the period between three years before and five years after the private equity investment  48 































































NOTE: The sample consists of 6398 patents awarded through May 2007 to 495 firms that received private 
equity backing between 1980 and 2005. Firms are only included in the sample if they applied for patents in 
the period between three years before and five years after the private equity investment  49 
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NOTE: The sample consists of 6398 patents awarded through May 2007 to 495 firms that received private 
equity backing between 1980 and 2005. Firms are only included in the sample if they applied for patents in 
the period between three years before and five years after the private equity investment The chart presents 
the incidence rate ratios and two standard deviation confidence intervals from the patent timing variables in 
the fourth regression in Table 3.  
 
  